Monthly masterminds, weekly updates, and networking with coliving operators worldwide.
State of Coliving . Worldwide
Coliving is consolidating from a venture-funded experiment into an institutional asset class. The 2020-2024 shakeout cleared a generation of asset-light operators (Common, WeLive, Quarters, HubHaus, Starcity, Bedly, Selina, The Collective). What emerged is a clear survivor cohort , Habyt, Cohabs, PadSplit, Coliwoo, DoveVivo/Joivy , each operating a distinct archetype that pattern-matched better to real estate's discipline than to venture capital's growth expectations. Coliwoo's November 2025 IPO on the SGX Mainboard and TAP's January 2026 IPO on SGX Catalist validated the asset class in public capital markets for the first time. Meanwhile Ares Management's €1B commitment to Colonies, Greystar's €300M acquisition to form Be Casa in Spain, and Ivanhoé Cambridge + Bouwinvest + Greystar's €1B European JV signal that institutional capital is now underwriting coliving as a distinct living-sector asset class. This worldwide State of Coliving hub covers 19 country markets, tracks the sector's failure and consolidation arcs, and presents attributed data ranges rather than blended market-size figures. The sector's next decade will be defined by whether the survivor archetypes scale, whether new institutional entrants (Bouygues, Nomo, Habyt's continued consolidation) deliver, and whether new regulated markets (UAE, France, Spain) develop institutional depth to match the UK's post-Collective maturity or Singapore's public-market discipline.
Last researched: July 14, 2026 . Everything Coliving synthesis of 19 country markets.
Global market size (2024 to 2030)
$12.8B-$18.5B to $25B-$42B
Source: EC synthesis of 5 research houses
(range)
CAGR
7.5% to 27.17%
(contested)
European operational units (2022)
24,500 + 70,500 pipeline (17 countries)
Source: JLL/ULI
Capital targeting UK+Europe (Savills Q2 2023 survey)
€2.6B over 3 years
Source: Savills
Countries covered by this hub
19 (+ this global page)
Digital nomad visas available worldwide
50+ countries (2025)
Every publisher measures coliving differently. Purpose-built only? Managed flatshares? PBSA-adjacent? Hybrid hospitality-coliving formats? Kost, WG, share houses, and other indigenous shared-living traditions? The numbers below diverge 3-4x because the definitions diverge 3-4x. Everything Coliving presents them as a range with each publisher named, so the reader can compare methodologies and choose the framework that fits their analytical need. This transparent range approach is the sector's competitive white-space , no other coliving-adjacent publication has consistently presented attributed multi-source market sizing at this depth. Grand View Research and Business Research Insights use tighter purpose-built definitions and produce lower absolute figures. Coliving.com aggregates broader shared-living including managed flatshares and PBSA-adjacent inventory, producing higher CAGR estimates. Everything Coliving's own synthesis attempts a middle-ground that reflects the operator dataset (500+ surveyed operators, 60+ structured engagements) while acknowledging methodological limits. The five research houses listed below collectively represent the sector's public market-sizing evidence base as of mid-2026.
Grand View Research
$7.82B (2024) → $16.05B (2030)
CAGR: 13.5%
Business Research Insights
~$15B (2024) → $26.88B (2033)
CAGR: 7.5%
Spherical Insights
$7.42B (2023) → $25.19B (2033)
CAGR: 13.0%
Market.us
$7.7B (2024) → $32.3B (2034)
CAGR: 15.4%
Coliving.com (citing source)
27.17% CAGR
CAGR: 27.17% (2023-2030)
Everything Coliving synthesis
$12.8B-$18.5B (2023-24) → $25B-$42B (2030)
CAGR: 8.5-13.2%
Everything Coliving statistics page
~$13B (2026) → $35B (2030)
CAGR: 21% (180+ operators)
Editorial note: The spread is driven by narrow (purpose-built only) vs broad (managed flatshares, coliving-adjacent PBSA, hospitality-coliving hybrids, indigenous shared-living traditions) definitions. Any single hero number is a marketing choice, not a data fact. Everything Coliving's editorial rule: name the source, name the year, present the range. This is why the country dossiers in this hub cite consultancy and year on every stat rather than picking a preferred figure. It is also why the UK bed count (7,540 per Knight Frank 2024), the Spanish bed count (11,885 per Atlas 2024 vs 19,089 per JLL late 2025), and the Singapore market share (Coliwoo 19.5% by rooms per IPO prospectus vs some secondary trade coverage citing 34% for TAP by managed keys) are presented as attributed ranges rather than consensus figures. This attribution discipline is the sector's institutional-grade research standard, and Everything Coliving applies it consistently across all 19 country markets in this hub.
The 2020-2024 shakeout produced a clear survivor cohort. Habyt, Cohabs, PadSplit, Coliwoo, and DoveVivo/Joivy consolidated share while the venture-funded generation collapsed.
The definitive lessons section
Selina, The Collective, Common, Quarters, HubHaus, WeLive, Bedly, Starcity , the story of what went wrong, with dates, dollars, and the one-line lesson for operators still building.
Selina
The sector's largest single failure by peak scale. At peak Selina operated approximately 30,000 beds across 100+ properties in 25 countries , making it briefly the world's largest coliving-adjacent hospitality operator. Went public via SPAC in October 2022 at a $1.2B valuation. Filed for insolvency July 2024. Defaulted on a $50M IDB (Inter-American Development Bank) loan and a $455K interest payment. Portfolio occupancy sat at 52.3% in 2023 , far below the 80%+ threshold needed for the business model to work at scale. Assets acquired by Collective Hospitality (Singapore) in August 2024 for a fraction of peak valuation. The Selina story is fundamentally about growing faster than operations could stabilize , 25 countries of inventory before achieving sustainable unit economics in any of them.
Lesson: Debt-fueled overexpansion beats marketing, and 25-country footprints do not compensate for below-threshold occupancy. The lesson: scale profitably in one geography before expanding into another.
The Collective
The UK's first large-scale purpose-built coliving pioneer and the sector's most cited valuation collapse. Fell into UK administration September 2021 (FTI Consulting joint administrators). £140M Deutsche Bank-led loan. 1,623 operating units at collapse vs a ~7,000-unit pipeline across UK, US, Ireland, and Germany. Old Oak Common (551 beds, opened 2016, once Europe's largest coliving property) was valued at £125M in 2018, marketed at £75M, and sold to Henderson Park for approximately £60M. Deutsche Bank and Gravis Capital were the main secured lenders. The Collective's operational units performed reasonably well; what killed the business was development pipeline debt that grew faster than operational cash flow could service.
Lesson: Development pipeline outrunning cash burn is the single most common coliving failure pattern. The lesson: match debt service to operational cash flow, not to pipeline potential.
Common
The US sector's second-most-cited collapse and the definitive asset-light master-lease failure case. Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing June 3, 2024 (CoStar). Operated 5,200 units in 12 US cities at collapse. Assets up to $10M vs liabilities up to $50M (Yahoo Finance / Fortune). Had merged with Habyt in January 2023 with a stated goal of becoming the world's largest coliving operator across 40+ cities and 14 countries. Habyt withdrew financial support ahead of the June 2024 filing, retaining the operable US buildings as a curated premium footprint but abandoning the full 5,200-unit portfolio. Common's asset-light model , master-leasing residential units from landlords and re-leasing them room-by-room , could not survive the post-2022 interest-rate environment as its spread economics compressed.
Lesson: Asset-light master-lease fragility plus interest rates. The lesson: master-lease coliving requires a rate environment that supports the spread; rising rates collapse the model.
Quarters (Medici Living)
Founded 2012 in Berlin as Medici Living, one of the sector's earliest scaled coliving brands. Rebranded to Quarters as part of a US expansion push. Collapsed 2021 after a failed $300M US expansion. The company had scaled a German coliving playbook successfully but could not translate that operational discipline to the US market, where zoning constraints, cultural differences in shared-living acceptance, and different capital-market dynamics undermined the German-style coliving formula. Quarters' collapse was the first major US coliving failure and preceded Common's by three years.
Lesson: US expansion without US real-estate discipline. The lesson: coliving playbooks do not automatically translate across markets; each country's regulatory, cultural, and capital-market environment demands a customized model.
HubHaus
Lease-arbitrage model that shut post-pandemic. HubHaus operated a strategy of leasing single-family homes and re-leasing rooms individually to residents. This spread strategy worked in a stable rental market with reasonable interest rates, but the pandemic-era shifts (increased WFH flexibility, urban-to-suburban migration, rate uncertainty) compressed the spread economics beyond viability. HubHaus is a canonical case study on why rate-sensitive spread strategies do not survive macroeconomic shocks.
Lesson: Rate-sensitive spread strategies do not survive shocks. The lesson: coliving unit economics must be robust to macro variance, not dependent on a specific rate environment.
WeLive
WeWork's coliving spin-off, abandoned in 2021. WeLive attempted to leverage WeWork's coworking brand into residential coliving, opening properties in Manhattan and Washington DC. The strategy assumed coliving would benefit from coworking's community programming, but WeLive struggled to reach occupancy targets even before WeWork itself entered its 2019-2020 crisis. When WeWork restructured, WeLive was abandoned as a non-core asset. This is the definitive case study on why coliving cannot be a coworking side-product.
Lesson: Coliving is not a coworking side-product. The lesson: residential coliving requires distinct operator DNA from coworking; the community-programming skills do not directly transfer to residential.
Bedly
Shut in 2019. One of the earliest US coliving startups. Operated an asset-light model similar to what Common would later scale. Bedly's collapse pre-dated the pandemic and pre-dated the broader coliving-sector shakeout , making it the earliest signal that asset-light coliving models faced structural fragility. The Bedly closure was a leading indicator; the industry did not adjust quickly enough to prevent the larger collapses that followed.
Lesson: Early asset-light model that did not survive the first cycle. The lesson: sector-wide fragility indicators should be studied when they appear, not after they replicate at scale.
Starcity
Folded 2021 after acquiring Ollie earlier in its operational history. Starcity operated a mid-market coliving strategy focused on San Francisco Bay Area and select US cities. The Ollie acquisition (2019) added scale but did not fix underlying unit economics. Starcity's collapse in 2021 was contemporaneous with Quarters' and preceded Common's by three years. The Starcity case is a study on why M&A does not fix broken unit economics.
Lesson: M&A did not fix the underlying unit economics. The lesson: consolidation transactions must improve unit economics of the combined entity, not just aggregate revenue; troubled operator + troubled operator = larger troubled operator.
Cross-cutting thesis: “Venture capital doesn’t work well with real estate” (Outpost CEO). Demands to grow in 10-15 markets rapidly are fatal in real estate. Survivors went asset-heavier (Cohabs PropCo), affordable/room-by-room (PadSplit), or disciplined management-first (Habyt post-2023, Coliwoo).
Click any country for the full dossier: operators, regulation, reports, ecosystem, FAQs.
| Country | Operational beds | Avg room rent | Regulation | Maturity |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| USA → | Fragmented; PadSplit 30,000 rooms | $729 (PadSplit) - $2,800 | Low (single-family zoning) | Mature but shaken |
| UK → | 7,540 (2023) | $1,800-$2,800 | Medium (HMO, H16) | Most mature |
| India → | 210,000 (2021) → 450,000 (2024E) | ₹10,000-₹35,000 | Low (no specific reg) | Fast-growth |
| Spain → | 11,885-19,089 (2024, contested) | €700-€1,000 | Medium-improving | High-growth |
| France → | ~18,000 (2024) | ~€590 (Colonies) | Improving (Le Meur) | Institutionalizing |
| Germany → | ~12,000-13,000 (2024) | ~$738 (Berlin) | Medium (tenant law) | Growing |
| Netherlands → | ~10,000-11,000 (2024) | ~€979 (Amsterdam) | Low (verkamering, WWS) | Constrained |
| Singapore → | Coliwoo 2,933 rooms; TAP 3,422 keys | S$1,200+ | Medium (URA explicit) | Institutionally mature |
| Australia → | ~2,334 (991 institutional) | $525/week+ | Medium (state rooming-house) | Emerging |
| Japan → | Share-house tradition; Oakhouse 541 houses | ¥35,000-80,000 | Medium | Mature (indigenous) |
| UAE → | ~3,500 listed rooms | 30-40% below whole-unit | Improving (2026 law) | High-growth |
| Portugal → | ~4,000 (2024) | ~€1,200 (Lisbon 1-bed) | Improving | Small/nomad |
| Ireland → | ~800 permitted; banned | n/a | Hostile (2020 ban) | Frozen |
| Italy → | DoveVivo/Joivy ~12,000 (group) | Varies | Medium | Growing |
| Canada → | Data gap | Data gap | Medium | Emerging |
| Mexico → | Data gap | Data gap | STR-entangled | Nomad hub |
| Indonesia → | Data gap | $500-$1,200 (Bali) | No specific reg | Nomad hub |
| Colombia → | Data gap | Data gap | STR-tightening | Nomad hub |
| New Zealand → | Data gap (UKO 1 space) | Data gap | Medium | Nascent |
Coliving Market Research & Trends
The full research pillar. Global market data, regional forecasts, demand drivers, competitive landscape.
Coliving Business Models
Master lease, PropCo, management agreement, franchise , the models that survived the shakeout.
Coliving Fundraising & Investment
Capital structures, investor pitch frameworks, and what killed the VC-only playbook.
Case Studies
Named EC client outcomes across advisory, technology, and marketing engagements.
Coliving Statistics
The EC statistics page. 180+ operator dataset, industry figures, regional breakdowns.
Compliance & Legal
Zoning, HMO, licensing, and lease structures across major markets.
Everything Coliving publishes the State of Coliving quarterly and works with operators on feasibility, market sizing, and regulatory navigation across 40+ countries.
